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In the inter-war period, Japan emerged as
one of the principal exporters to many colonies
and semi-colonies of the Western powers in
South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East
and others [Redford 1956: 249-262; Shimizu
1986a: Ch. II]. One of the major factors in
Japan's rapid trade expansion was the steep fall
in shipping charges for Japanese goods, which
contributed greatly to the reduction in the
prices of Japanese goods in overseas markets,
as by the early 1930s Japanese shipping com-
panies had established various regular foreign
shipping routes. In this respect, it is worth
while to note that Denis Koh Soo Jin and
Tanaka Kyoko state with regard to the
Malayan market of the 1930s that ''Japanese
competition in invisible items (i.e. services such
as banking, insurance, shipping, etc.) is not
dealt with because of its relative unimportance
and the difficulties in gauging such compe-
tition..." [Koh and Tanaka 1984: 374].
However, as far as shipping is concerned, one
cannot easily dismiss it as "relatively unim-
portant." Indeed, in the inter-war period
shipping constituted an important integral part
of Japan's trade expansion strategy into
various parts of the world including British
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Malaya [Ellinger and Ellinger 1930: 191-
194; Ginsburg 1949; Hichens 1939: 661-
678; Shimizu 1986a: 81-84].
The case of the Netherlands Indies is par-
ticularly interesting, because it was one of the
few foreign markets for which Japan became
the largest supplier in the 1930s, leaving the
colonial power far behind. Dutch-Japanese
shipping competition seems to have played an
important part in her success by contributing
greatly to the reduction in the prices of Japa-
nese goods in the Indies market. Despite the
importance of the subject, however, as far as I
am aware there exists at present no specialist
study on. this, even though some scholars
including Asahara, Broek, Morris-Suzuki and
van Gelderen give brief accounts of it in their
works [Asahara 1978: 138-140, 181-183,
369-376; Broek 1971: 67-69; Morris-Suzuki
1984: passim; van Gelderen 1939: 73-76].
This article therefore traces the origins and
development of the Dutch-Japanese shipping
competition on the Java-Japan route, and to a
lesser extent, on the coastal and inter-island
shipping routes of the Indies archipelago dur-
ing this period, studies the role of the Japanese
and Dutch Indies Governments towards the
settlement of the shipping issue, and examines
the relationship between shipping competition
and Japan's trade expansion.
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Java-Japan Shipping Route to 1931
Prior to 1902, there had been no direct
shipping between Java and Japan, and Japa-
nese goods had been mainly transported to the
Indies via Singapore, and Indies produce
including Javanese sugar largely through the
same route.1> But in that year, the Java-
China-japan Line (JCjL) was formed with a
capital of 15 million guilders by several Dutch
shipping companies including the Nederland
Line and the Rotterdam Lloyd Line, and in
the following year began to operate a direct
route for the carriage of passengers and cargo.
It provided one trip every four weeks between
java and Japan [Kaji 1943: 74-75; Kata-
yama 1982: 401; Yoneda 1943: 6-7]. It
received a loan of 300,000 guilders a year at a
very low-interest rate from the Hague Govern-
ment in the first five years of its establishment,
250,000 guilders in the second five years, and
200,000 guilders in the third five years. How-
ever, theJCjL made so much profit during the
First World War that it was able to repay all
the debts to the government by 1919 [Asahara
1978: 139; Kaji 1943: 75]. Indeed, its
annual dividend rose steeply from 8.5 per cent
in 1913 to 20 per cent in 1917 and 30 per cent
in 1918 [Kok 1931: 189]. Actually, this
was the first case where the Dutch Government
gave low-interest loans to a shipping company
1) However, it should be noted that until after
the outbreak of the First World War, Japan's
trade with the Netherlands Indies remained
fairly small. During the period 1909-13, for
example, the Japanese were responsible for a
mere 1.25 per cent of the Dutch colony's total
imports and took 4.26 per cent of its total
exports [Broek 1971: 113].
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under the Dutch flag. However, the agree-
ment ofJuly 1902 stipulated that the JCJL was
to obtain the Indies Government's approval
for the appointment of directors and its autho-
risation for any alteration in the company
regulations, while the government officials
could check the, company's account books at
any time and attend the meetings [Kaji 1943 :
74-75].
It was, however, not until 1912 that a
Japanese shipping company began to operate
the route--initially via Taiwan and Singa-
pore. In that year three shipowners put their
capital together to form the Nanyo Gumi under
the auspices of the japanese Ministry of Com-
munications. It began to operate three 3,000-
gross-ton class ships on the route for the trans-
port of passengers and cargo, and received from
the ministry a subsidy of 75,000 yen in 1912,
150,000 yen each in the next two years, and
75,000 yen in 1915 [Asahara 1978: 140]. In
1914, the company was re-organised under the
name of Nanyo YOsen Kaisha (NYKA), a
joint-stock company. Actually, the ministry
had earlier failed to persuade the Nippon
Yiisen Kaisha (NYK) and the Osaka Shosen
Kaisha (OSK), two major Japanese shipping
companies, to establish the route, not only
because the amount of the subsidy offered was
not large enough, but also because they were
not sure of its profitability [ibid.].
In the early years of its operation, the
NYKA's southbound route included Chilung
and Singapore, and the company was far from
competing with the JCJL on the Java-Japan
route, not only because it took many days to
travel between Japan and Surabaya but also
because their ships were old with crews unused
to foreign shipping routes [Katayama 1982:









































Fig. 1 Japan and Southeast Asia in the Inter-war Period
404]. Actually, most of the goods destined
for Java were trans-shipped at Singapore;
Indeed, most of those Japanese merchants who
resided in the Indies normally obtained via
Singapore such goods which were transported
first by the NYK or other ships on the ]apan-
Europe or Japan-Calcutta routes--there
were then frequent and speedy shipping
services available from Japan to Singapore
[loco cit.].
After the outbreak of World War I, there
developed world-wide shipping shortages,
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which deteriorated as the war continued.
During the war years the tonnage of European
ships serving the Indies declined sharply due
to sinkings or recalls to their home countries
in Europe. Thus, the tonnage of the Dutch
ships fell from 20 million at the outbreak of the
war to 15 million in 1918, that of the U.K.
from some 5.4 million to a mere 1.34 million,
and that of Germany from about 2 million to
practically nil. Italy, Spain and Denmark
also witnessed a steep decline in the tonnage
of their ships. However, during the same
period, that of japan rose from 0.6 million to
some 1.23 million [NKZ 6(2): 27-28. 29
February 1920]. Besides, In the virtual
absence of severe European competition in the
Indies import trade, japan began to supply
the Dutch colony with large quantities of
manufactured goods, thereby requiring more
shipping services on thejava-Japan route. The
value of japanese exports to the Indies rose
steeply from a mere 5.5 million guilders in 1913
to 104.8 million guilders in 1918. Similarly
that of her imports from the colony, comprising
mainly primary commodities (particularly
sugar), rose from 35.8 million guilders to 77.8
million guilders during the same years [Takei
1929: 244]. As a result, japan's average
annual share in the Dutch colony's total im-
ports rose suddenly from a mere 1.25 per cent
during the period 1909-13 to 10.04 per cent
during the period 1914-18. However, during
the same years her average annual share in its
exports increased only slightly from 4.26 per
cent to 4.38 [Broek 1971: 113]. Naturally,
the NYKA did not fail to seize the golden op-
portunity to reap huge profits. But the com-
pany limited its dividend to only 10 per cent a
year during the war, with the result that it was
6
able to increase its capital from 1.5 million yen
in October 1914 to 5 million yen in May 1920
[Sumita 1925: 1910].
In the meantime, in May 1916, the aSK
began to operate first the Java-Chilung route
as the Taiwan Government's subsidised ship-
ping route (receiving an annual subvention of
100,000 yen), using two ships of more than
3,000-gross tons each. But because of enor-
mous demand for shipping services during the
war years when, in the near absence of Euro-
pean competition, Japan began to supply the
Indies with large quantities of consumer goods,
the aSK's ships started to make voyages from
the japanese ports to java through some Tai-
wanese ports.2) At the same time the com-
pany increased the number of the ships to three,
providing one trip a month instead of one trip
in every two months [Asahara 1978: 139].
Now, the NYKA's port of call at Chilung was
terminated in order to avoid excessive compe-
tition with the aSK. Moreover, in March
1918 the NYK opened the japan-java, java-
Calcutta, and Calcutta-New York routes--
the first route was set up as the company
wanted to open the second [ibid.: 181-182].
By the spring of 1920, however, the major
European powers had resumed exporting their
goods to the Indies in competition with Japan.
Also there was a post-war economic recession
in the Indies which lasted from 1920 to 1923.
As a result, there was a steep fall in demand
2) It would be wrong to assume that the aSK
hastily decided to establish the Java-Japan
route simply to take advantage of the wartime
boom, as the company had made preparations
for it before the outbreak of the First World
War. For further information about this, see
[Asahara 1978: 138-139; Katayama 1982:
388-411].
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for Japanese imports whose value fell from
some 134,140,000 guilders in 1920 to some
57,494,000 guilders in 1922 [Takei 1929:
244], the fall coinciding with the over-supply
of shipping services from Japan to Java.
Similarly, the value of the Indies' exports
to Japan declined from 140,010,000 guilders in
1920 to 109,573,000 guilders in 1923 [loco cit.].
There were cargoes on the northbound route
to Japan, but these were not sufficient to fill up
all the regular ships. Actually, none of the
Japanese shipping companies was doing well.
However, the JCJL's performance was much
better than theirs for several reasons. First, as
will be studied later, the Japanese shipping
companies heavily relied on the foreign ship-
ping agencies in Java for the collection of
cargoes, but these agencies also acted for many
other shipping companies all at the same time.
On the other hand, the JCJL had its own
branches at Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya,
Makassar, Manila, Amoy, Hong Kong, Shang-
hai and Kobe [Yoneda 1943: 8-9]. Second,
the]apanese shipping companies normally had
to call at all the designated ports on the
subsidized routes whether there was sufficient
cargo to load or not, whereas the subsidized
routes operated by the Dutch-flag companies
were made rather flexible, permitting them to
skip certain ports [NKZ 6(2): 32-34. 29
February 1920]. Third, for the transport of
ebony and laun to Japan, the Koninklijke
Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM), another
Dutch-flag line, issued through bills of lading
to the JCJL. Without them, high trans-
shipment and warehousing charges would have
had to be paid by the shippers. At any rate,
the Japanese ships on the route were not well
equipped to carry huge logs [Takei 1929:
201-202]. Finally, although the JCJL did
not receive any direct subsidy, it was given by
the Batavia Government the sole right to
transport overseas Chinese between Amoy and
Java to the total number of some 30,000 a year
[NKZ 6(2): 32-34. 29 February 1920], and
one could argue that this constituted a sort of
indirect subsidy to it.
As there was excess tonnage of ships oper-
ating on the southbound route from Japan to
Java, the average freight rate for general
merchandise per ton fell from 16 yen in Janu-
ary 1921 to 12 yen in December 1921 [Sumita
1925: 1000]. Actually, in order to cope with
the difficulties the JCJL and the three Japa-
nese shipping companies concluded in October
1921 a shipping conference agreement on the
route from Japan to Java concerning the
freight rates, allocation of cargoes and the
deferred rebate system. But this agreement
came to an end in December of that year, as
the terms were not strictly complied with by
the members. By the mid-1922, however, the
freight rate for general merchandise had further
fallen to 9 yen [loco cit] and thus in June 1922
a new agreement was signed by the four ship-
ping companies, with similar terms [Wakimura
1934: 27; OSKG (337): 12 June 1935].
The conference was kept in force until the early
1930s and there was no dispute among them
until then. It should be noted that there was
no agreement on the route from Java to Japan,
but the freight rates remained more or less
similar to each other. This is because there
was far less competition on the northbound
route. Actually, transportation of manu-
factured goods was more profitable than that
of foodstuffs and raw materials due to the
higher freight rates for the former.
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The Rise of the Ishihara
Sangyo Kaiun Kalsha
Up till 1931 there were three shipping
companies operating on the direct Java-Japan
route in the conference of 1922, viz. the jCjL,
the NYKA and aSK. As for the NYK, it had
by this time ceased temporarily the operations
between japan and Calcutta via java. In
early 1931, the Ishihara Sangyo Kaiun Goshi
Kaisha [the Ishihara Enterprise Shipping
Company] (ISK) applied to join the con-
ference but was refused admission. In March
1931 it therefore decided to inaugurate
regular shipping services on the route, offering
freightage at 20 per cent below the conference
rates. In retaliation, the conference com·
panies also cut down their freightage by 20
per cent while at the same time raising the
deferred rebate rate from 10 per cent to 20
per cent, the new rates being backdated to 1
january of that year [Wakimura 1934: 27-
28].
Unlike its japanese rivals, the ISK did not
receive any subsidy, and was yet able to offer
low freight rates. The reasons for its strength
are not hard to find. The company's main
interests in the South Seas were in iron mining
in johore. Initially it relied for the trans-
portation of iron ore from Batu Pahat in the
Malay Peninsula to the Yawata Iron Works in
Northern Kyushu, Japan on the aSK in 1920
and 1921, and on the Kokusai Kisen Kaisha
[the International Steamship Company] in
1922 and 1923. In 1924, Ishihara Hiroichiro,
the founder and president of the Nanyo Kogyo
Koshi [the South Sea Mining Company] in
Osaka, which was renamed the Ishihara
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Sangyo Kaiun Goshi Kaisha in 1929, managed
to obtain a loan of 2.5 million yen at a very low
interest rate from the japanese Ministry of
Finance, of which 1.04 million yen was used to
purchase three old ships and the remainder
was partly spent on expanding the mining
facilities in the Malay Peninsula. He then
continued to build up the fleet of ships, and by
1930 he could transport in his ships over half of
the iron ore to japan. In the meantime
Ishihara came to the view that ifhis ships could
carry Japanese goods to the South Seas at low
costs on their way to Batu Pahat rather than
returning there in ballast, this would not only
cut down the operating costs but also facilitate
Japan's rapid trade expansion into Southeast
Asia [ibid.: 29-30].
At this juncture, it may be worth while
explaining the relationship between the ISK
and the Nanyo Soko Kaisha [the South Seas
Godown Company]. The Nanyo Soko Kaisha
was established by the Bank of Taiwan with a
capital of 5 million yen in Taipei in 1920, and
had branches in Semarang, Surabaya, Canton,
Singapore and Batavia. It also established re-
presentative offices in Cirebon, Cilacap and
Probolinggo ports. However, the company
needed to have a satisfactory means of dealing
with warehouse bonds in order to function as
a warehousing company, and it proved to be
best to entrust the java Bank to play this role
for the company. TheJava Bank accepted the
responsibility of handling its warehouse bonds
on the condition that its Surabaya branch
became a local subsidiary. Thus, the branch
was made N.V. Nanyo Veem incorporated
under the Netherlands Indies law in December
1927, and the Java Bank became the auditor
to the new company. Handa Jisaburo, the
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former branch manager of the Taiwan Bank at
Batavia, was appointed its managing director.
The Nanyo Veem then leased a southern part
of the Surabaya jetty and built a new ware-
house there. It also made use of the old
warehouses at Surabaya, Batavia, and Se-
marang, and rented a warehouse at Cirebon,
and others built by the Mitsui & Co. Ltd. in
Cilacap and Probolinggo [JFMA. F.1.6.0/7.
Despatch 171. 27 June 1931].
The Nanyo Soko Kaisha had initially
suffered financial difficulties partly because of
the post-war recession and partly because of
Chinese boycotts. In the first four years of its
operations since 1920 it incurred a total ac-
cumulated debt of 400,000 yen, and the
Taiwan Government had to give a subsidy of
250,000 yen [Nakamura 1981: 239]. Mter
the establishment of the Nanyo Veem, its
performances somewhat improved. Even-
tually, it fell under the control of Ishihara
Hiroichiro after he guaranteed the Bank of
Taiwan for accepting the company's liabilities
[JFMA. F.1.6.0/7. Despatch 171. 27 June
1931; ibid. Despatch 185. 24 July 1931].
When the ISK inaugurated its shipping
services on the Java-Japan route in 1931, it
made the Nanyo Veem its sole agency, and
also asked various European concerns, in-
cluding the Handels Bank and the Factoriji, to
act as its agencies in different parts of Java,
but it failed to get their support, largely
because they were under the pressure of the
conference companies, particularly the JCJL
[JFMA. F.1.6.0/7. Despatch 123. 28 April
1931]. Thus, besides the Nanyo Veem, the
company had the Nichi-in Shokai and Tsubono
Shokai as its agencies at Makassar [Nanyo
K yokai 1932: 297]. Also, although Handa
of the Nanyo Veem planned to reduce loading
charges, the Java Bank was against his idea.
Thus, the ISK could not cut down the rates.
At any rate, loading charges were hitherto not
decided only by the shipping companies on the
regular Java-Japan route, but by all those
whose ships called at the Javanese ports
[JFMA. F.1.6.0/7. Despatch 68. 16 March
1931].
Although the Nanyo Veem, when it came
into being, offered to act as a shipping agency
for the aSK and the NYKA, neither of them
was interested in the Japanese-controlled
godown company [loco cit.]. This is probably
because they preferred to use well-established
European agencies with better facilities, and
also because they apparently did not wish to
make use of. the services provided by the
godown company under the control of their
rival. The NYKA had as its shipping
agencies, Maclaine, Watson & Co. at
Batavia, Fraser Eaton & Co. at Surabaya,
MacNeill & Co. at Semarang, and Michael
Stephens & Co. at Makassar [Nanyo
Kyokai 1932: 297]. As for the aSK, it had
a branch in Surabaya and had as its agencies
Klaasen & Co. at Batavia, Kwik Hoon Tong
Handel Mij at Semarang, and Gatz Java
Trading Co. at Makassar [loco cit.]. But some
of the shipping agencies were large firms which
were working for a number of shipping com-
panies all at the same time, and were not fully
committed to providing services to shippers for
the Japanese shipping companies alone. In
the early 1930s, Fraser Eaton & Co., for
example, acted as agencies for eight shipping
companies including the NYKA [loco cit.].
Moreover, neither the NYKA nor the aSK
had any warehouse of its own. Thus, the ISK
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was in a better position in this respect.
The NYKA operated four ships on theJava-
Japan route, all of which were under the
Japanese Ministry of Communications' sub-
sidy. As for the aSK, its two ships, 8urabaya
Maru and Batavia Maru, received subsidies
from the Taiwan Government, but the com-
pany's two other ships on the route were not
subsidised. As noted earlier, there was no
conference on the northbound route from Java
to Japan, but it just happened that the rates
offered by the JOJL and the two Japanese
shipping companies were similar to each other.
As the carrying capacity of the conference
companies was not sufficient during the busy
seasons, they had mutually agreed that when-
ever there were excess cargoes bound for Japan,
each company would provide ships on a
temporary basis, but such ships were not
permitted to carry the cargoes which were
originally contracted to be transported by the
regular ships. In practice, apart from the
JOJL the two Japanese shipping companies
provided only a few temporary ships. Instead
of the a8K and the NYKA, such Japanese
companies as Yamashita and Tatsuma pro-
vided tramp ships to Java to take up excess
cargoes. As a result, shippers operating on a
small scale found it very difficult to have access
to regular shipping services to Japan, and they
naturally welcomed the entry of the ISK
(JFMA. F.1.6.0/7. Despatch 123. 28 April
1931].
As of 1931, each conference company had
four ships in operation on the route, and each
ship made six trips a year. The total tonnage
was 30,993 for the JOJL, 17,536 for the a8K,
and 16,061 for the NYKA. As for the 18K, it
owned six ships with a total tonnage of 33,572,
all of which called at the main Javanese ports
on their way to Batu Pahat, whereas on their
way to Japan four called at these ports and two
others sailed direct to Japan. Initially the
18K's ships had set off from Kobe, but by the
summer of 1931 they began their southbound
voyages from Yokohama and reached J ohore
after calling at Nagoya, Kobe, Moji, and
various Javanese ports. Moreover, in order to
build up its fleet of ships, the company had two
new ships built, namely Nagoya Maru and
Johore Maru, both equipped with pulverised
coal combustion engines, which could cut down
the duration of the voyage as well as the cost of
operations. Thus, the 18K reduced the
freight rates further [Wakimura 1934: 27-
28].
Table 1 Carryings of the JCJL and the Three Japanese Shipping
Companies on the Route from Japan toJava
(Percentages of Total Tonnage)
1929 1930 1931 1932
JeJL 53.6 54.3 50.0 35.5
NYKA 25.0 27.3 18.5 17.6
aSK 21.4 18.4 16.8 18.0
18K 14.7 28.9







Sources: [JFMA. B.2.0.0/J/N 2-1-4, Memorandum, Undated 1934; Wakimura 1934: 27]
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As Table 1 reveals, the carryings of the ISK
on the route from japan to java rose from nil
in 1930 to 14.7 per cent in 1931 and 41.5 per
cent in 1933, whereas those of all the three
conference companies fell steeply. However,
unlike all the others the NYKA operated its
ships only on this route, and therefore suffered
a fatal blow. Fortunately, as its large share-
holders included several influential individual
shipowners and as the company was a re-
cipient of a subsidy from the japanese Ministry
of Communications, the company did not
easily go bankrupt.
The KPM and Japanese COD1petition
on the Coastal and Inter-island
Routes
Besides the jCjL, another Dutch-flag com-
pany, the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maat-
schappij (KPM) also began to suffer from
increasing japanese competition In the late
1920s and the early 1930s. It had been set
up with a capital of 50 million guilders by the
Nederland Line and the Rotterdam Lloyd Line
in 1888, and began operations in 1891 [Nany6
Dantai Rengokai 1943: 428; Hyde 1964:
37-39]. It continued to grow in size and
soon began virtually to monopolise the coastal
and inter-island shipping of the Indies, not only
because of the official protection but also
because of the fact that, apart from java, the
inland communications of the Dutch colony,
such as railways and highways, remained
underdeveloped. In addition, the KPM came
to link the Indies with Africa, Australia, South
Pacific and South and Southeast Asia through
an extensive network of shipping. In 1939 it
operated 64 routes of which 32 were subsidised
routes, and employed as many as 9,438 crew
(of whom some 8,000 were Chinese and
Indonesians) [Watanabe 1943: 115; Yoneda
1943: 116-119].
The company's shipping charges were known
to be exceptionally high. The cost of trans-
portation of manufactured goods from Sura-
baya to Makassar by the KPM (458 miles)
was, for example, similar to that from Kobe to
Surabaya by the NYKA (over 3,000 miles).
Moreover, as the railway fare was made close
to the KPM freight rates, it was not cheap to
send goods by rail [Takei 1929: 203-204].
This explains why it was that the coastal and
inter-island trade was not greatly developed in
the archipelago. However, the company
claimed that it was not making huge profits
because it had to maintain many unprofitable
lines in accordance with the Indies Govern-
ment policy (even though the company
received from the Hague Government an
annual subsidy of 520,000 guilders during the
period 1925-30, and of 325,000 guilders there-
after). Thus the KPM maintained that it
was trying to make balances by charging high
freight rates wherever possible [Kaji 1943:
70]. But one would have to point out that the
company's operating costs were high, not only
because of the payment of high salaries to
Dutch crew, but also because it maintained
many "unreasonably" luxurious ships [Yamada
1934: 25; Yoneda 1943: 179].
Incidentally, H.W. Dick is of the view that
" ... except during the Depression of the 1930s,
traders do not seem to have shown much dis-
satisfaction with the cost of shipping by the
KPM ..." [Dick 1987: 12]. Moreover, van
Gelderen of the University of Utrecht simply
states that the jCjL
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suffered heavy losses and steadily lost
ground. This situation became more
dangerous when the Japanese companies
also tried to extend their direct traffic to an
increasing number of ports, instead of
confining themselves .•. to the traffic with
some major ports and transferring the
cargoes for internal distribution to the KPM
[van Gelderen 1939: 73-74].
It should, however, be pointed out that in the
1920s, one of the major difficulties faced by
Japanese merchants was the high costs of the
coastal and inter-insular shipping services
provided by the KPM. Actually, the Japa-
nese shipping companies were anxious to break
the monopoly of the Dutch-flag company.
Prior to the establishment of a direct Japan-
Sumatra route in 1928 by the OSK, the bulk
of Japanese goods destined for Sumatra was
transported by the OSK, the NYK and other
shipping companies first to Singapore or
Penang where they were trans-shipped onto the
ships of the KPM, the Straits Steamship
Company or the P. & O. Company for
Sumatra. Similarly, local produce in the
island was shipped to Japan via Singapore or
Penang. As a result, costs of transportation
were very high, and cargoes were sometimes
subject to considerable delay and damage
[NKZ 16(2): 43-44. 1 February 1930].
Actually, it cost 10 yen per ton for the trans-
portation of miscellaneous goods from Japan
to Singapore, but 12 yen 50 sen from Singapore
to Belawan (Medan's port) [JFMA. F.1.6.0/
7. Official Letter. 6 November 1928]. Even-
tually, after obtaining permission from its
conference members, as from November 1928
the OSK increased the number of its ships
from three to six, and made two trips a month
instead of one trip on the Calcutta route. Its
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ships on the route began to call at Belawan
once a month from that month. Now it took
only 17 days from Japan to Belawan, thereby
cutting down not only the duration of the
voyage by 5 or 6 days, but also freight rates by
more than 5 yen a ton [ibid. Official Letter.
11 December 1928; NKZ 16(2): 43-44. 1
February 1931].
Another route which one of the Japanese
shipping companies established was the Java-
Sumatra route. It cost 12 yen per ton for the
transportation of miscellaneous goods by the
Japanese ships from Japan to Batavia (over
3,000 miles), but it cost 24 yen from Batavia to
Padang (575 miles) by the KPM [JFMA.
E.3.1.1/4. Official Letter. 8 January 1928].
As the KPM virtually monopolised the Indies'
inter-island shipping, it had trans-shipment
agreements with other shipping companies at
the various Indies ports. Eventually, in May
1932 the NYKA decided to extend its Java-
Japan route to Padang, and began to call
frequently at Oosthaven as from October 1932
while calling at Palembang from 19 July 1933.
The KPM immediately demanded the Japa-
nese company to give up the additional ports
of call, threatening that unless the NYKA
complied with its demand, the Dutch-flag
company would break a trans-shipment agree-
ment with it. As a counter-measure, the KPM
attempted to increase the carryings of the
KPM-JCJL on Japan-Padang route via Java
by inducing Dutch merchant houses in the
colony to use only their services. However,
as the Japanese company cut down its freight
rates greatly, it was able to attract many
shippers [JFMA. F.1.6.0/7. Official Letter. 9
August 1933].
The KPM also faced competition from the
H. SHIMIZU: Dutch-Japanese Competition in the Shipping Trade
Daiichi Tora Maru, a 200-gross-ton ship,
owned and operated by S. Shiohara whose
shipping company, the Shiohara Kaiun
Shokai, was established in Surabaya with a
capital of 30,000 yen in 1931 (the only ship
owned by the company) [Yoneda 1943: 176-
177]. The ship was put in operation in the
northern Celebes in january 1931. Initially
his ship carried produce for Arabs and Chinese
on a chartered basis. At that time the KPM
was charging so high freight rates for trans-
portation of sugar from Surabaya to Manado
that sugar prices became very high. Shiohara
therefore decided to transport it on the route in
response to the request by Chinese traders, and
thus opened the java-Celebes route in compe-
tition with the KPM. Whereas the KPM
charged 4 guilders 25 cents for transportation
of a bale of sugar from Surabaya to Manado,
the Daiichi Tora Maru charged only 2 guilders
(for contracted prices) [JFMA. F.1.6.0J7.
Despatch 124. 13 May 1936].3) Later his ship
was chartered by japanese shippers for the
transportation of ebony logs between Manado
and the Tomini Bay, and also by the Nomura
Higashi-Indo Shokusan [the Nomura Nether-
lands Indies Enterprise] for the transportation
of rubber from Banjarmasin to Surabaya for
trans-shipment to the U.S. Although the
japanese-flag company constituted only a
minor threat to the KPM, the Dutch-flag
company tried to get rid of it by seeking
official support or through attacks on it in local
3) According to Yoneda, however, the KPM
charged 4 guilders for the transportation of a
bale of sugar on the route, whereas theJapanese-
flag company charged a mere one guilder and
could still make profits [Yoneda 1943: 179-
180]. However, the freight rate of 1 guilder a
ton seems to have been too low to be profitable.
newspapers [loco cit.]. This was because the
Arab and Chinese shippers, who were dis-
satisfied with the company's high charges,
favoured the Daiichi Tora Maru, hurting its
pride and reputation. The KPM had hitherto
maintained the monopolistic position by taking
over new local entrants which might compete
with it, and actually made an abortive at-
tempt to take over the Shiohara Kaiun Shokai
by offering a large sum of money to the owner.
Although in 1936 the Indies Government
passed a law reserving the coastal shipping for
the Dutch-flag company, the Japanese com-
pany was permitted to continue to operate
there because it had already obtained official
permission for that [Watanabe 1943: 109-110;
Yoneda 1943: 176-177]. In late 1936, Shio-
hara replaced his 200-gross-ton ship with a
new and larger ship of 428 gross tons, certainly
because his business was profitable.
Dutch-Japanese Shipping Negotiations
By the early 1930s, the Netherlands suffered
from Japanese competition not only in the
shipping trade but also in the import trade of
the colony, largely because Japanese goods
which comprised mainly consumer goods,
particularly textiles, were much cheaper than
similar Dutch articles.4) Actually, japanese
goods had been cheap in the 1920s, but they
became even cheaper during the Depression
years because of several reasons. First, during
the period of the deflationary policy in Japan,
1927-31, rationalisation took place, par-
4) In 1931, for example, yams and piece goods of
all kinds accounted for 55.5 per cent ofJapan's
total exports to the Netherlands Indies [Nanyo
Kyokai 1936: 176-177, 182].
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ticularly in the textile industry, and it was
carried much further in the 1930s. Con-
sequently, productivity was greatly raised with
a considerable fall in the costs of production
[Allen 1981: 153; Shimizu 1986a: 31-32] .
Second, in December 1931,Japan left the gold
standard, and subsequently the yen was
allowed to depreciate, whereas the Dutch
guilder, on which the Indies guilder was based,
remained on gold until september 1936. As a
result the exchange value of the yen fell from
113.3 Indies guilders per 100 yen in 1931 to
50.25 Indies guilders in 1933 and 42.69 guilders
in 1935. The depreciation of the yen resulted
in the steep fall in the prices of Japanese
imports in the Indies market [Nanyo Kyokai
1936: 99-100; Altes 1979: 157-173]. Third,
as already noted, there was Dutch-Japanese
shipping competition that led to a drastic fall
in freight rates, and this further contributed to
the decline in the prices ofJapanese goods.
During the Depression years, cheap Japa-
nese goods became especially attractive to local
consumers whose purchasing power was greatly
curtailed. As the Indies was heavily de-
pendent upon the world market for her agricul-
tural commodities, sugar being the most im-
portant, she was particularly hard-hit when
the prices and demand for them plummetted.
Indeed, during the years, 1928-35, the agricul-
tural exports fell by some 34 per cent in terms
of volume and by 75 per cent in terms of value
[Shimizu 1986b: 7-8]. Thus many local
consumers substituted cheap Japanese goods
for similar but more expensive European ones.
I t is therefore not surprising to find that the
Dutch share in the import trade fell steeply
from 17.7 per cent in 1929 to 15.4 per cent in
1931 and 12.4 per cent in 1933, whereas
during the same years the Japanese share rose
sharply from 10.9 per cent to 17.1 per cent and
31 per cent (see Table 2).
As the large Dutch import merchants who
had previously dealt mainly in European goods
found it increasingly difficult to sell such goods
in the Indies market, they set up branches or
representative offices m the Kobe-Osaka
region in the late 1920s and early 1930s,
through which they began to import Japanese
goods in large quantities in direct compe-
tition with Japanese importers in Java [Bluett
1933: 45].
In view of these developments, the Dutch
authorities at Batavia tried to protect against
Table 2 The Dutch Indies' Trade with Japan and the Netherlands
(Percentages of Total Value)
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Imports from
Netherlands 17.7 16.7 15.4 15.8 12.4 13.3 13.4 16.7 19.1 22.2 21.0
Japana> 10.9 12.0 17.1 21.2 31.0 32.5 30.1 26.7 25.4 15.0 18.1
Exports to
Netherlands 16.0 15.3 17.4 19.1 18.5 21.4 22.5 23.6 20.1 20.4 14.6
Japana> 3.3 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.9 4.0 5.4 5.6 4.5 3.2 3.4
Note: a) includes Formosa
Source: Shimizu [1986b: 18]
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Japanese competition the Dutch trade with the
colony, the Dutch merchants, and the two
Dutch-flag companies. In September 1933,
it therefore passed a Crisis Import Ordinance
which permitted the government to limit the
import of any article by quotas or prohibitions.
Now, "established" merchant houses were
issued with import licences on the basis of
their shares in the Indies' total imports during
a specific period in the past, and could import
certain specified goods from any country of
origin within the limits. This was designed
primarily to protect the well-established Dutch
merchants against Japanese importers. It
would appear that the Dutch authorities at
Batavia were able to "encourage" Dutch
merchant houses to use the JCJL's shipping
services on the Java-Japan route [Imperial
Shipping Committee 1939: 91-92]. The
JCJL also worked closely with the KPM with
a view to attracting shippers, as the KPM
owned cranes, quays, lighters and godowns at
all the Indies ports, and was in control of
cargoes in the inter-insular carrying trade
[ibid.: 24].
In 1933, a Dutch merchant in Semarang
bought in Japan 200 tons of fertilisers for the
Indies Government, and arranged for its
shipment in an OSK ship. But at the begin-
ning of the October he rearranged it and
shipped 100 tons by the JCJL and the remain-
ing half by the OSK, probably as a result of
the pressure from the Dutch authorities
[JFMA. F.1.1.0j3-9. Telegram 93. 16
October 1933]. Similarly although on 24
April 1933 the JCJL and the three Japanese
shipping companies had agreed on a freight
ratio for Japanese cement, with each having
an allocated share of 25 per cent up to 48,000
barrels a month, the Batavia Government
planned to give all the cargoes to the Dutch-
flag company as from February 1934 (the
agreement was to be rescinded in January
1934) [ibid. Letter. 12 October 1933; ibid.
Telegram 117. 1 November 1933].
I t should not be assumed that by this time
the Dutch and Japanese shipping companies
had not taken any action to bring an end to
the shipping war. As the rate war dragged on,
the Japanese Government decided to intervene
in August 1932. After several meetings with
the government's mediation, the four com-
panies (including the NYK) reached an
agreement on 26 August 1932, and then invited
the JCJL to join them. On 28 September of
the year, they managed to conclude a con-
ference agreement with the Dutch-flag com-
pany under the following terms which were to
be put into effect as from 1 January 1933
[JFMA. F.1.6.0j7. Letter 1391. 22 November
1932]:
a) each company operates three trips a
month;
b) the freight rate is to be fixed within 80
per cent of the former conference rate,
and the rate from Java to Japan is also
to be fixed;
c) a deferred rebate will be permitted;
d) a freight ratio system for cargoes will be
considered.
It is not very hard to find the reasons why the
JCJL decided to join the new conference.
During the 1932, the company suffered from
increasing financial difficulties due to severe
Japanese competition, political unrest and the
depreciation of silver in China, the last two
reasons contributing enormously to the decline
in its north-bound cargoes, and also to a steep
fall in the number of Chinese immigrants to
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the Indies [Bluett 1933 : 89] . Thus the
number of new Chinese immigrants had been
over 40,000 a year from 1920 to 1930, but fell
to some 12,000 in 1932 and 9,000 in 1933
[Purcell 1965: 465].5)
The average share price of the JCJL fell
from 145.12 guilders in 1929 to 100.25 guilders
in 1931 and 28.65 guilders in 1933. Indeed,
in the early 1930s the company gave no
dividend to the shareholders [Nanyo Kyokai
1936: 60]. There was even a proposal that
the JCJLbe sold to the KPM at the cost of
4.5 million guilders, but this was unanimously
rejected during the general meeting on 22 July
1932 of the shareholders in Amsterdam [Bluett
1933: 89].
In the event, the conference companies were
unable to agree on the freight ratio for cargoes
on the southbound route with the result that
a new rate war began in 1933. The Indies
Government asked for a 50 per cent share for
the JCJL on the grounds that two of the
Japanese shipping companies received sub-
sidies whereas the Dutch-flag company was
not a recipient of any subsidy [JFMA. F.l.6.0/
7. Telegram 106. II October 1933]. More-
over, on 29 September 1933, the representa-
tives of the large Dutch merchant houses in
the Indies, the Intematio, Geo Wehry, and
Lindeteves visited Koshida Saichiro, the
Japanese Consul-General at Batavia, and
informed him that the JCJL ought to get a
50 per cent share, and also that up to 90 per
c@nt of all the import trade of the Indies with
Japan ought to be handled by the Dutch
5) However, not all the Chinese immigrants into
the Indies used the jCjL's shipping services.
Also, Chinese residents· returning there were
not included in these figures.
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merchants [JFMA. F.1.1.0/3-9. Telegram
102. 3 October 1933].
In October 1933 the three Japanese shipping
companies agreed to give the JCJL a 27 per
cent share but the latter asked them to give it
a 33 per cent share. Then, in May 1934 the
JOJL and the japanese companies were on the
point of reaching an agreement on the basis of
31 per cent for the Dutch-flag line, and the
shipping issue was about to be solved. How-
ever, in June of that year the abortive Dutch-
japanese commercial talks began at Batavia
to discuss the problem of Japan's trade ex-
pansion,6) and the J eJL refused to accept the
31 per cent share. Now the Dutch authorities
proposed to put the shipping issue on the
agenda of the talks, undoubtedly in the hope
that they could wring a larger concession for
the JCJL from Japan, since the Japanese had
accumulated huge trade surpluses with the
Indies by this time.'1) However, the japanese
delegates insisted that it ought to be separated
from the general economic issues, and proposed
that a separate meeting be held between the
JOJL and the Japanese companies in Kobe
later on. The Batavia Government reluc-
tantlyagreed [Asahara 1978: 360].
Thus in January 1935 the executive mem-
bers of the KPM and the J OJL and the re-
presentatives of the Japanese shipping com-
panies met to discuss the shipping issue. How-
6) Further information about the conunercial
talks of 1934 can be found in [NKZ 21 (1): 12-
14. 1 january 1935; ibid. 21(3): 1-5. 1
March 1935].
7) In 1933, for example, japanese exports to the
Netherlands Indies amounted to the value of
some 98,4 million guilders, as compared with
some 22.8 million guilders for her imports
from it [Broek 1971: 113].
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ever, the meeting broke down without even
touching on the issue itself, apparently because
they could not agree on which language-
English or japanese-should be used there
[Kaiun (160): 58. 1 September 1935; NKZ
22(7): 2. I july 1936]. But it should be
noted that before the talks the japanese com-
panies intended to give the jeJL a maximum
of 31 per cent share whereas the Dutch-flag
company was, determined to get at least 40
per cent on the grounds that it was making
heavy losses due to the fact that its freight
charges were largely paid in the depreciated
yen but its operating costs had to be paid
mainly in guilder [Takei 1935: 306]. Thus,
there was an irreconcilable difference from the
beginning, and the talks were doomed to
failure in any case.
After the breakdown of the Kobe talks, the
Batavia Government intensified its restrictive
measures against japanese imports which
were rapidly replacing Dutch goods in the
Indies market, and at the same time endeav-
oured to encourage merchants to use Dutch
shipping services by importing goods on a
f.o.b. basis and exporting goods on a c.i.f.
basis. Also the Batavia Government intro-
duced a quota system, and did not permit the
import of certain goods unless they were
carried in thejCjL ships [Kaiun (160): 58. 1
September 1935]. These measures naturally
helped to accelerate the jCjL's share at the
expense of the japanese companies. Indeed,
the combined japanese share fell to less than
50 per cent by the summer of 1935 [loco cit.].
The shipping competition also resulted in the
reduction of the freight rates to some 30 to 40
per cent of the former conference rates
[Asahara 1978: 372].
As the japanese Government realised how
much the japanese shipping companies were
suffering from the Batavia Government's
measures, and as it feared that other countries
might resort to similar action to deal with
japanese competition in the shipping trade
elsewhere, it decided to establish a new ship-
ping company, Nanyo Kaiun Kaisha [the
South Seas Shipping Company], by taking
over all the shipping routes serving the Indies,
operated by the four japanese shipping com-
panies (including the NYK). The Nanyo
Kaiun Kaisha was founded in Tokyo with the
total paid-up capital of 8.5 million yen on 6
july 1935, and it owned the 14 ships in the
total tonnage of 73,400 which were purchased
from the shipping companies at a low price of
60 yen per ton irrespective of the age of the
ships. The japanese Government made the
Kobe-Batavia route a subsidised route for the
new company which was then required to
provide four trips a month. As the NYKA
was operating only on the japan-Indies route,
it was completely dissolved [ibid.: 371; OSKG
(337): 59. june 1935].
Since this was a national policy company,
Asano Hajime, Director of the Shipping
Control Section of the Ministry of Communi-
cations was appointed President. Also, al-
though the NYK did not take an important
part on the japan-Indies routes, Terai Hisa-
nobu, a chief of the Cargo Section of the NYK
was appointed the managing director, probably
because the NYK was japan's largest and most
influential shipping company. Ishihara Riro-
ichiro became the advisor, partly because the
ISK contributed the largest tonnage of ships
towards the formation of the new company
[Kaiun (160): 3-6. 1 September 1935].
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At the time of the formation of the Nanyo
Kaiun Kaisha, Ishihara Hiroichiro made a
manifesto in consultation with the Japanese
government authorities that the Japanese
Government needed to pass a trade protection
law and to give priority to the settlement of
the trade issue with the Indies Government
rather than to that of the shipping issue.
However, the government decided to deal
first with the shipping issue and planned to
hold a preliminary meeting with the JCJL in
Kobe. As a result, Ishihara quit the post of
the advisor in protest [Kaiun (165): 4. 1
February 1936].
On 28 November 1935, Terai Hisanobu of
the Nanyo Kaiun Kaisha, and the Kobe
branch manager of the JCJL, held a prelimi-
nary meeting in Kobe, but they could not
agree on the freight ratio: the former insisted
that the freight ratio should be based on the
1933/34 percentage figures, whereas the latter
maintained that it ought to be on the basis of
those of 1934/35 (when the Dutch-flag com-
pany regained the upper-hand thanks to the
various restrictive measures taken by the Dutch
authorities against its Japanese counterparts)
[ibid. (164): 1-2. I January 1936]. Thus,
the talks broke down, and since the Nanyo
Kaiun Kaisha's board of directors' meeting
was postponed as a result of Ishihara's resig-
nation and also since there was no agreement
on the freight ratio between the JCJL and the
Indies Government, there were no more ship-
ping talks for a while [ibid. (166): 7-8.
March 1936].
As the Dutch authorities continued to im-
pose various restrictions on Japanese imports,
both the volume of Japanese imports in the
Indies market and the share of the Nanyo
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Kaiun Kaisha fell continuously. However, it
was not just the Japanese company which
suffered from the Indies import restrictions.
Both it and the J CJL were now short of cargoes
on the route from Japan to the Indies: Japan's
share in the import trade fell from 32.5 per
cent in 1934 to 30.1 per cent in 1935 and 26.7
per cent in 1936 (see Table 2). The JCJL's
ships were barely full thanks to their monopoly
of cement transportation. On the other hand,
on the northbound route the ships of the two
companies were full of sugar and maize. But
unlike miscellaneous goods and cotton textiles,
freightage for them was very low, and neither
of them was making large profits. As the
JCJL was making heavy losses, it once again
considered a merger with the KPM. But it
was clear that a merger per se would not
eliminate severe Japanese competition [Kaiun
(170): 1. 1 June 1936].
As for the Nanyo Kaiun Kaisha, its principal
base was the direct Java-Japan route, and its
subsidiary routes were the Java-Japan routes
via Taiwan and Hong Kong. Also it operated
on the Java-Borneo route, the Java-Celebes
route, and the Singapore route for Batu Pahat
iron transportation to Japan. In the spring
of 1936, it was striving to set up a Java-South
China or Java-Dalian (North China) route
with a view to competing with the JCJL. As
the company's financial difficulties were
growing, the Japanese Government decided
to grant it a subsidy of 400,000 yen. Actually,
in the first quarter of 1936 the Nanyo Kaiun
Kaisha's share of the carryings from Japan to
Java declined to some 30 per cent [ibid. (168):
1-3. I May 1936].
In the meantime, Ishihara Hiroichiro an-
nounced on 25 March 1936 the establishment
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III Osaka of a new shipping company, the
Nanyo Koro Kabushiki Kaisha [the South
Seas Shipping Line Company], with a capital
of 2 million yen. He planned to provide two
trips a month as from mid-April on the Java-
Japan route, and intended to charter four
8,000-ton class ships. It not only aimed at
providing shipping services to the Indies,
South China, the Straits Settlements, India,
and Australia, but also at managing ware-
housing and other shipping-related businesses.
Ishihara also intended to use the ISK's
branches and representative offices as agencies
for the company, and in Java the company
would make full use of the Nanyo Veem's
facilities [ibid.: 1-3, 6-7]. However, the
Japanese authorities were strongly opposed to
the formation of Ishihara's new company,
undoubtedly because they feared that it would
further aggravate the shipping competition and
make it more difficult for them to negotiate a
settlement with their Dutch counterparts at
Batavia.
At a special parliamentary session on 1 May
1936, the government proposed a Shipping
Routes Control Law, and on the thirtieth of the
month it was enacted. Under this law, the
government could give a warning to a ship-
owner if he was considered to be engaged III
excessive competition which was likely to
hamper the healthy development of Japanese
shipping trade. If the warning was not
heeded, then the government could place a ban
on the operation of the company concerned.
Thus this law was designed primarily to
prevent unnecessary competition among Japa-
nese shipping companies [ibid. (170): 2-3.
July 1936].8) As this law was applied to the
8) Details about the Shipping Routes Control
N anyo Koro Kaisha, Ishihara was unable to
operate his ships on the Java-Japan route.
Thus the introduction of the Shipping Routes
Control Law was a great relief not only to the
Nanyo Kaiun Kaisha but also to the JCJL.
In the meantime, in April 1936 the new
Japanese Consul-General at Batavia, Ishizawa
Yutaka tried to solve the problem of the
shipping issue with G.H.C. Hart, Director of
Economic Affairs of the Indies Government,
laying groundwork for formal Dutch-Japanese
shipping talks. And, on the 27th of April,
Terai Hisanobu of the Nanyo Kaiun Kaisha
left Kobe for Java, and on his arrival there a
meeting took place between him, Hart and
some executive staff of the JCJL in Batavia.
Eventually, on 10 June a conference agree-
ment was formally signed with terms valid for
three years beginning from 1 July (see Table
3). The agreement also stipulated that as
from 1 July 1936 the pre-1931 conference rates
were to be adopted, and that all the secret
freight rebates were to be done away with and
instead a uniform 10 per cent deferred rebate
was to be adopted. Incidentally, according
to Morris-Suzuki the Dutch-Japanese shipping
conference was
opened in Kobe III 1935 with four Dutch
and eight Japanese participants (one of
them being Ishihara himself). At this
point, however, the Japanese government
decided that it was necessary to make some
gesture of conciliation towards the East
Indies. The three Japanese companies
involved in the Java route were ordered to
merge into a single concern ... Nanyo
Kaiun K.K. and Japan accepted Dutch
demands that this company should restrict
its share to 60 per cent of the traffic between
Law can be found in [Imperial Shipping Com-
mittee 1939: 131-132].
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Note: a) These were the Netherlands Indies' outports where cargoes were trans-shipped
onto ships heading for Japan or for other destinations when they arrived from Japan.
Source: Imperial Shipping Committee [1939: 93]
J a pan and Java . .. [Morris-Suzuki 1984 :
160].
However, as already noted, the conference of
january 1935 did not produce any agreement.
Nor was the new Japanese company formed to
make "some gesture of conciliation" towards
the Indies. Finally, as the Nanyo Kaiun's
share had fallen to as low as some 30 per cent
on the route from Japan to Java just before
the settlement of the shipping issue in 1936,
one could argue that the percentage of the
carryings given to it was considered to be
favourable to japan.
The Dutch-flag company had planned to be
merged to the KPM, but now there was no
need for it. It then continued to provide two
trips a month. As for the Nanyo Kaiun
Kaisha, it had provided six trips a month, but
now planned to cut down the number to five
from August. Also it retained a monthly
serVIce on the Java-Japan route via Hong
Kong. Since the japanese Government had
decided to grant 400,000 yen as an annual
subsidy, it was to receive a total of 580,000 yen
of which the Taiwan Government provided
180,000 yen as a subsidy for the Taiwan-Java
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route [Kaiun (171): 6. I August 1936].
The freight rates from Japan to Java were
raised to the pre-1931 conference rate level for
the time being. I t was then announced to
shippers that it would be raised by 30 per cent
by two stages: the first stage by 15 per cent
increase as from 1 November 1936, and the
second by another 15 per cent as from I
November 1937. The freightage from Java
to japan was also to increase by the same
percentages. In addition, the freight rates
for Japan-Padang and Japan-Palembang were
to be raised by 10 per cent and 5 per cent
respectively as from I November 1936 [ibid.
(174): 7-8. 1 November 1936; ibid. (175):
1. 1 December 1936]. Thanks to the agree-
ment of 1936, there was no more major ship-
ping dispute between the two countries in the
remainder of the 1930s.
Conclusion
The shipping rate war which began on the
Java-Japan route in the early 1930s was
initially not between the Dutch and japanese
shipping companies, but was triggered by the
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entry of the 18K, a Japanese company on the
route. Interestingly, it later developed into
Dutch-Japanese competition. However, the
competition between the KPM and some
Japanese companies on the inter-island and
coastal shipping of the Indies archipelago was
caused as a result of the successful attempts by
the latter to break the near monopoly on
certain routes of the Dutch-flag company,
which charged high freight rates.
The intense competition was one of the
major factors for Japan's rapid trade expansion
as the freight rates on the routes were so much
reduced that the low transportation costs
helped greatly to cut down the prices of
Japanese goods 10 the Indies market. Even
in the 1920s when the Dutch- and Japanese-
flag companies were operating on the Java-
Japan route in the conference, Japan had a
distinct advantage over her European rivals
including the Netherlands since the trans-
portation costs of her goods to the Indies were
much lower thanks to her geographic prox-
imity. In 1929, for example, the freight rate
for 40 cubic feet of textile manufactures was 26
shillings and half a penny from Osaka to
Batavia (3,264 miles), as compared with 67
shillings 6 pence from Liverpool to Batavia
(8,986 miles). [Ellinger and Ellinger 1930:
192]. During the period of the intense ship-
ping war in the 1930s freight rates for trans-
portation of Japanese goods to the Indies fell
enormously. Since the shipping companies
resorted to price cuttings independently and
since they made secret agreements with ship-
pers on low freight rates, it would be virtually
impossible for anyone to know exactly how
low the freight rates were. But, as already
noted, they had fallen to some 30 to 40 per
cent of the conference rates by the summer of
1935. It is therefore beyond doubt that the
shipping competition did help to cut down the
prices of Japanese goods a great deal, facili-
tating Japan's trade expansion into the Indies.
Ironically it was both the Japanese and Dutch
shipping companies which helped to improve
the competitive edge ofJapanese imports over
similar Dutch goods, as they were both
engaged in the cut-throat competition.
Eventually, the Dutch authorities at Batavia
abandoned the laissez-faire policy in 1933, and
resorted to protective measures largely to deal
with Japanese competition in the shipping and
import trades. The Japanese Government
also decided to intervene in the shipping issue.
Unlike the private companies which were
primarily concerned with profit maximisation,
the two governments had to take into account
Dutch-Japanese diplomatic and political re-
lations in addition to the economic interests of
their own countries. Thus, the terms of the
1936 agreement reveal that the Dutch and the
Japanese authorities were still anxious to work
out a compromise solution for the sake of
mutual benefits. Naturally, one cannot agree
with Broek's view that the shipping issue was
settled "without direct government inter-
vention, but the outcome was no doubt in-
fluenced by the possibility that the Indies
Government might act ..." [Broek 1971:
68].
To conclude, the inter-war Dutch Indies
witnessed the decline of the Netherlands as a
major supplier for the colony as well as a
predominant maritime power on the Java-
J a pan route as a result of the emergence of
Japan as a formidable rival in the shipping
and import trades. Indeed, the Japanese
21
military occupation of the Indies in early 1942
was preceded by the deterioration in the
economic power of the Netherlands in the
colony.
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